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The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids sub-
jecting a defendant who has already been in jeopardy to retrial for the
same offense.1 Although the clause was held applicable to the states a
decade ago, 2 its implementation varies widely across jurisdictions. The
difficulty in formulating uniform standards stems from the breadth
and conceptual complexity of double jeopardy problems.3 In order to
focus on the problem of multiple litigation arising out of the same
factual allegations, this Note examines double jeopardy in the posture
of successive prosecutions4 for criminal offenses5 against the same de-
fendant by the same sovereign.6 The discussion concentrates on suc-
cessive prosecutions in which jeopardy has attached in the first trial,7
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. ") For a discussion of the common law roots
of double jeopardy, see M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 4-16 (1969).
2. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) (overruling three-year-old pre-
cedent, United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 &
n.6 (1978) (citing seven other cases from 1977 Term presenting "subtle and complex
problems" of double jeopardy).
4. The Note considers only punishment imposed by sentence following conviction,
thus obviating the need to determine what forms of sanctions are punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) (revocation
of parole after acquittal on same charges in criminal trial not double jeopardy viola-
tion); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1967) (punishment by prison
disciplinary board for act for which prisoner also convicted in criminal trial not double
jeopardy violation).
5. Double jeopardy serves only to bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same
offense and thus permits adjudication of a civil suit based on an incident that was already
prosecuted criminally. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Le Tourneur
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1044 (1977) (deportation after conviction not double jeopardy violation).
6. Conviction or acquittal in a federal or state court will not bar retrial for the same
offense in the other system. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). United States courts can also prosecute one who has already
faced trial abroad. E.g., United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 967 (1978).
7. Jeopardy attaches before the verdict, see United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579 (1824), at the point the jury was sworn, see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
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trial has proceeded to completion," and appeal has not upset the judg-
ment.9
Under current law, a defendant, whether acquitted or convicted at
a first trial, may be confronted with identical evidence at a second trial
for an offense that could have been joined and tried in the initial
prosecution. The clause bars such an action only if the offenses in each
trial are the "same." Two centuries of interpretation, however, have
provided no "same offense" standard capable of fulfilling the clause's
intent. 10 Moreover, a second legal doctrine, criminal collateral estoppel,
also provides inadequate protection.
This Note seeks to correct the deficiencies of sole reliance on same-
offense tests and collateral estoppel to bar successive prosecutions. First,
it examines the inadequacies of these two doctrines and establishes
their failure to implement the goals for which the double jeopardy
clause stands. Then the Note offers a proposal-a procedural mechanism
liberalizing the application of collateral estoppel. This mechanism
offers a means of improving double jeopardy protection without a
radical reformation of current law.
I. Same-Offense Tests: A Confusing Tangle
A standard that determines what constitutes the same offense-the
definition by which double jeopardy protection is accorded or with-
held-is not easily developed. This problem lies at the heart of the
double jeopardy guarantee and is its most vexing aspect. 1 Existing tests
have been unable to fulfill adequately the purposes of double jeopardy.
A. The Purposes of Double Jeopardy
Three principles underlie double jeopardy: it is wrong to retry an
individual found not guilty;' 2 it is wrong to retry an individual already
8. The issue of the permissibility of retrial following mistrial comprises a large por-
tion of double jeopardy law. See Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
449 (1977). Current law permits a retrial if the declaration of mistrial or dismissal is
supported by a high degree of necessity. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978);
Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
9. If a defendant's appeal is successful, he may be retried only if the reversal is pred-
icated on trial error. In such cases the retrial is conceptually a continuation of the
original trial for the same offense. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (overruling
three Supreme Court double jeopardy cases).
10. See pp. 965-69 infra (describing inadequacies of current same-offense tests); Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 450-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (meaning of "same of-
fense" open to judicial construction since adoption of Fifth Amendment).
11. See J. SIGLER, supra note 1, at 63-69; Haddad & Mulock, Double Jeopardy Prob-
lems in the Definition of the Same Offense: State Discretion to Invoke the Criminal Pro-
cess Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. RaV. 515, 515 (1970). It is also the most frequently litigated
double jeopardy issue. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note I, at 89.
12. Retrying the acquitted increases the likelihood of convicting the innocent. Swisher
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convicted; 13 and it is wrong, if avoidable, to subject anyone to more
than one trial.14 In addition to the increased threat of convicting the
innocent or of violating the convicted's expectation of finality, the
second trial itself is an overbearing use of governmental power. 15 The
clause attempts to free one who has already been placed in jeopardy
from continuing anxiety, expense, and insecurity about his future. 6 In
order for this policy to be effectuated fully, it must extend not only to
subsequent trials duplicating the same charge, but also to subsequent
trials that involve the same factual allegations in a different charge that
could have been consolidated in the first trial. 17 The government, in
needlessly retrying the same facts, prolongs the anxiety, expense, and in-
v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 216 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
Innocent defendants may lack the stamina to fight the second time; they may also
plead guilty initially rather than face protracted trials, realizing that even if the prosecu-
tor once suffers defeat, he may be able to prevail in subsequent trials. Knowlton, Criminal
Law and Procedure, 11 RUTGERs L. REv. 71, 95 (1956). Subsequent trials permit the
prosecutor to strengthen his case by coaching his witnesses to alter their testimony, see
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 nA (1978), by reexamining the weaknesses in his
first presentation to strengthen the second, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352
(1975), or by preparing to counter the accused's defense, see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1,
at 4. Earlier prosecution can be treated by the prosecutor as a "dry run." See Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
13. This principle is rooted as much in the need for finality as in solicitude for
justice. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873). Once convicted, the defendant can plan his life only if his
sentence is final. The double jeopardy clause thus seals off the first sentence from
augmentation even when justice would not be offended by imposition of an additional
sentence on one already convicted-as, for example, when facts come to light proving that
the mitigating circumstances that moved the judge to clemency were manufactured.
Diminution in sentence, however, is permitted. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
14. Whether the first trial results in acquittal, conviction, or no verdict, a primary
purpose of the double jeopardy clause is prevention of multiple trials. United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); see Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970) (regardless of
ultimate legal consequence, second trial is itself "an ordeal not to be viewed lightly"); cf.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975) (government permitted to appeal
acquittal following guilty verdict, as reversal would mandate only reinstitution of verdict,
not retrial).
15. The state, because of its vastly superior resources, must be denied power to sub-
ject defendants to the expense and ordeal of repeated trials for the same offense. United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 95 (1978); id. at 105 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, double
jeopardy protects against use of judicial process as an instrument of oppression. Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 459 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Abuse of the criminal pro-
cess is foremost among the feared evils that led to the inclusion of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in the Bill of Rights."). Checking the virtually unfettered discretion that prosecutors
in this country enjoy, see id. at 452; Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940), is the primary purpose of the clause, see J. SIGLER, supra
note 1, at 155. Effective rules to police prosecutors are required because they evince no
reluctance to reprosecute for the same offense until satisfied with the sentence. Bray,
Evidence of Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions, 28
U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 509 (1974).
16. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187 (1957). Moreover, the clause conserves societal resources and precludes in-
consistent results due to multiple trials. M. FRIEDLAND, suPra note 1, at 4.
17. See, e.g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
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security suffered by the accused. Since there is no reason to assume that
the prosecution could not have obtained the same result at one trial,
and since the second trial entails harms against which the double
jeopardy clause is aimed, the second trial violates double jeopardy
purposes.' 8
B. Same-Offense Tests
Two alternative tests determine whether offenses are the same for
double jeopardy purposes; both purport to implement the purposes
of double jeopardy across all contexts. But, in many instances, neither
prevents the government from reintroducing the same evidence at
subsequent trials. Accordingly, both fail to prevent the harassment of
multiple trials.
1. The Same-Evidence Test
Under the test most often used, two offenses are the same if each
requires proof of the same facts.19 This same-evidence test, recognized
by American courts for over a century,20 is based on the requirements
of proof, not on the actual evidence tendered at trial.21 The Supreme
Court articulated the test's current formulation in Blockburger v.
United States:2 2 two offenses are distinct if each requires proof of a
fact that the other does not.23
18. United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1979) (repeated risks of
conviction and ordeal of multiple trials for same conduct violate core of double jeopardy
clause).
19. See, e.g., King v. United States, 565 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978) (following conviction
for importing heroin, defendant convicted of conspiracy to import heroin); United States
v. Hairrell, 521 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1975) (following conviction for possessing counterfeit
money, defendant can be prosecuted for same charge if different times and places in-
volved).
20. The rule was first enunciated in England five years after the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, see Rex v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461
(Ex. 1796), but was not recognized in this country until eighty years later, see Morey v.
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871). Morey was soon followed by the Supreme
Court. See Ex Porte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
21. See, e.g., Hattaway v. United States, 399 F.2d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam)
("Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is
required which is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other, although the same
acts may be necessary to be proved in the trial of each.")
22. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
23. The Blockburger rule has been consistently reaffirmed. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Under this rule, a greater and lesser included offense, e.g., ag-
gravated and simple assaults, are classified as the "same," for only one requires allegation
of an element not contained in the other. Id. at 168-69.
Commentators break the same-evidence test into separate branches: the same-required-
evidence, the same-alleged-evidence, and the same-actual-evidence. See, e.g., Note, Twice
in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 269-71 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy].
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In the context of a single trial on a multicount indictment, the
same-evidence test fulfills the purposes of the double jeopardy clause.
In such cases, the goals of protecting defendants against multiple litiga-
tion and preventing prosecutorial jury-shopping are irrelevant; only
the goal of preventing multiple punishment for one offense is per-
tinent. The same-evidence test prevents multiple punishments by
ensuring that the defendant not be convicted at one trial of more
crimes than the jurisdiction has authorized.
But this test provides inadequate protection in cases of successive
prosecutions.24 Its name notwithstanding, the same-evidence test does
not bar a successive trial on the same evidence because the same evi-
dence can support distinct charges for offenses requiring slightly dif-
ferent elements of proof.25 If criminal statutes have marginally different
requirements for proof, this test eviscerates double jeopardy protec-
tion.26 It would not forbid such anomalies as six successive trials for
The first branch is the Blockburger test, the second refers to the requirements of proof
as set forth in the indictment, and the third bars retrial if the same evidence is introduced
at both trials. Although a few older cases followed the same-alleged-evidence test, see,
e.g., People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 232, 233 P. 88, 91 (1924); State v. Nash, 86 N.C.
650, 651-52 (1882), it has fallen in the last half-century into deserved desuetude, see Note,
Successive Prosecutions Based on the Same Evidence as Double Jeopardy, 40 YALE L.J. 462,
463 (1931). It is doubtful whether the same-actual-evidence test has ever been followed.
Two cases are usually cited as supporting this test: People v. Martinis, 46 Misc. 2d 1066,
261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1965), and Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 103, 143 P. 64 (1914). See
Twice in Jeopardy, supra, at 270 n.33. The first case, however, is a disguised ruling of
collateral estoppel; the second case, one of double jeopardy's most confused expositions,
mentions the test only in dictum.
Courts today uniformly apply the Blockburger formulation, although they sometimes use
terminology that perpetuates the illusion that other tests retain their vitality. See, e.g.,
Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26, 32 (10th Cir. 1973) (identity of charges hinges on
"facts alleged" in two indictments).
24. Commentators distinguish simultaneous from successive prosecutions, and some
advocate differential treatment for double jeopardy in the two contexts. E.g., Note, Statu-
tory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitu-
tional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 359-68 (1956). Others contend that double jeopardy is
completely inapplicable to simultaneous prosecutions. E.g., Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six
Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 81, 86 (1967). Courts, by contrast, are
insensitive to the distinction. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (applying
Blockburger rule, derived from simultaneous prosecutions, to successive-trial context).
25. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); see Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (defendant previously convicted for behaving in indecent
manner in public place; subsequently convicted on same evidence for insulting public
officer).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908
(1977) (armed robbery separate statutory crime from carrying and using firearms in com-
mission of felony). The twentieth century proliferation of statutory definitions of different
crimes is a well-recognized phenomenon. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10




one act of sexual intercourse,27 seventy-five successive trials for as many
poker hands,28 and five successive trials for the simultaneous em-
bezzlement of five $100 bonds.20 Not even successive acquittals would
free the defendant from the scourge of retrial or of reintroduction of
the same evidence to prove the defendant committed a "similar act"
to the one on trial.30
In virtually all cases, offenses that arise from the same evidence can
be prosecuted together. When, instead of joining all such offenses in a
single trial, the government chooses to present essentially equivalent
evidence to successive juries, it may be seeking to maximize the pros-
pects of at least one conviction or to guarantee adequate punishment.
Thus the same-evidence test enables the prosecution to circumvent the
double jeopardy clause.31
2. The Same-Transaction Test
The same-transaction test requires that "all the charges against a de-
fendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or
transaction" be prosecuted together at one trial.32 Historically, the
27. See Commonwealth v. Burk, 2 Pa. County Ct. 12 (1886) (conviction for adultery,
fornication, and bastardy); Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Of-
fenses, 7 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 79, 82 (1937) (possibility also of convictions for rape, incest,
and impairing morals of minor).
28. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (each act of betting
distinct offense).
29. See Commonwealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass. 1, 8-9 (1868) (each serial number acts as
separate proof for different offense).
30. See, e.g., Jones v. Blankenship, 602 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant acquitted
of murder because jury found malice lacking; subsequently convicted for malicious wound-
ing of another victim of same shotgun blast); United States v. Cylkouski, 556 F.2d 799
(6th Cir. 1977) (following acquittal of conspiracy to violate federal gambling laws, de-
fendant prosecuted for federal offense of conspiracy to violate state gambling laws).
The prosecution also frequently introduces identical evidence of similar acts. Such
"similar-acts evidence" shows that the defendant previously committed acts resembling
the current charge. It can be introduced to show motive, intent, modus operandi, and
various other elements, but not to show recidivism or evil character. See FED. R. EvID.
404(b). Similar-acts evidence is currently admissible even when it underlies a previous
acquittal. See, e.g., Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 889
(1968) (constitutional to admit testimony of prosecutrix from previous rape case in which
defendant acquitted, to show characteristic behavior pattern). But see Wingate v. Wain-
wright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972) (when defendant acquitted of two previous robberies,
evidence that he committed them in trial for third robbery inadmissible because of double
jeopardy).
31. Justice Brennan criticizes the same-evidence test not merely for failing to enforce
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, but for effectively annulling it. See
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
32. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). Under this test,
incidents of the same transaction, whether repeated commissions of the same crime, such
as numerous poker hands at one sitting, or temporally proximate or simultaneous com-
missions of separate crimes, such as incest and rape or burglary and larceny, must be
tried together.
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common law required such compulsory joinder.3 3 Because this joinder
is inapplicable to simultaneous charges, it reflects a sensitivity to the
distinction between simultaneous and successive prosecutions left un-
addressed by the same-evidence test. Moreover, the same-transaction
test serves the goals of economy and convenience. In contrast to the
same-evidence test, which allows precisely the same evidence to be
reintroduced at successive trials, the same-transaction test forbids repeti-
tive litigation over the same factual contentions.34
Although the same-transaction test is theoretically compelling, in
practice it offers inadequate protection because it is impossible to de-
fine its content precisely. "Transaction" is a malleable term; no def-
inition can forestall prosecutorial strategies to try separately incidents
of the same course of conduct. Only the breadth of one's perspective
and imagination sets the bounds on the "same transaction." 35
The test's inadequacies are apparent in the states that follow it;30 it
can be manipulated to obtain opposite results. 37 Thus some defendants
enjoy legitimate double jeopardy protection, while others in virtually
33. From the Middle Ages through the eighteenth century, the defendant was tried
for the entire underlying factual transaction, not for a statutorily defined offense with
particular evidentiary requirements. See Note, supra note 24, at 342-43; cf. Raven's case,
84 Eng. Rep. 1065, 1073 (1662) (applying Statute of Clergy, 25 Ed. 3, stat. 6, c.5, enacted
in 1350, which required use of same-transaction test in case against clergyman).
34. Compulsory joinder in civil trials is urged to conserve judicial resources, to prevent
inconsistent results, and to protect the defendant against vexatious litigation. See F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 542-43 (2d ed. 1977). In criminal cases, the judicial-
resources problem is no less acute, inconsistent results are even more egregious, and
harassment of the defendant is more severe and less rectifiable. The civil defendant does
not live in fear of his liberty and can recover costs if the plaintiff's suit proves groundless.
The criminal defendant enjoys no such protection. Cf. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242
U.S. 85, 87 (1916) ("It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly
mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in
debt.").
35. State v. Boyd, 533 P.2d 795, 797 (Or. 1975); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 116-17, 17
S.E.2d 573, 573-79 (1941).
36. Although several states have adopted the same-transaction test, see, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), adhered to
on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Kellett v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 409 P.2d 206, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1966), it has never been adopted
in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 944 (1979); Vanetzian v. Hall, 562 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). It has, however, been
ceaselessly championed in dissents by Justice Brennan. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma,
429 U.S. 1053, 1054 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing ten dissents advocating same.
transaction test).
The same-transaction test also enjoys wide support among commentators. E.g., Note,
Double Jeopardy: A Protection or an Empty Promise? 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 838, 842 (1973);
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 23, at 292-96.
37. Compare State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975) (conviction for selling
heroin bars subsequent prosecution for possession) with State v. Vasquez, 135 N.J. Super.
303, 343 A.2d 152 (1975) (permitting separate prosecutions for selling cocaine and pos-
sessing it on day search warrant grounded in first offense executed).
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identical circumstances are either deprived of their constitutional
right3" or given an unjust immunity.39 The problem is inherent in
reliance on the definition of so protean a term.40 Because the test is
toothless, it fails either to offer systematic protection to defendants41 or
to remedy the defects of the same-evidence test.42
38. Compare People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 NAV.2d 222 (1973) (fact that prior
kidnapping conviction was for acts committed in different county does not allow sub-
sequent prosecution for rape and assault during same transaction) with People v. Ward,
30 Cal. App. 3d 130, 105 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1973) (fact that prior kidnapping, assault, and rape
of victim was committed in different county permits subsequent prosecution for sex
perversion upon victim's mother, performed in same car shortly afterwards). Differentiating
between the transaction and the larger criminal enterprise is but another way of carving a
transaction into separate offenses, the vice this test was meant to eradicate. See People v.
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 342, 217 NAV.2d 22, 29 (1974) ("[a]lthough the attempted unlawful
possession of a credit card charge grew out of the assault with intent to rob charge," two
were "separate transactions"); Note, One Transaction-One Conviction: The Texas Doc-
trine of Carving, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 623, 630-31 (1973) (Texas same-transaction variant
applied in virtually every conceivable way).
39. Unjust immunity arises in states that have adopted the identical-element test, a
variant of the standard same-transaction test. This variant finds offenses to be the same
if they share a common essential element. Thus, rape and kidnapping could be prosecuted
separately because they share no identical element. See, e.g., State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336,
380 P.2d 998, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 46 (1963). But because the essential element of a
gun is common to assault with a deadly weapon and attempted kidnapping while armed
with a gun, conviction for both is impermissible. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 106 Ariz.
492, 478 P.2d 517 (1970).
The identical-element test is too restrictive. The legislature may justly wish to punish
two crimes arising from the same incident. See note 27 supra. Under the identical-element
test, separate convictions for the two crimes, whether at the same or successive trials, are
barred; accordingly, legislative will is contravened. Such a contravention in the context
of simultaneous prosecutions cannot be justified. Eliminating the possibility of multiple
convictions does not fulfill the goals of the double jeopardy clause. Cf. Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (three convictions at one trial permissible if Congress intended
to proscribe same activity under three statutes). Moreover, even if the test were limited to
successive prosecutions, it would provide no protection against prosecuting successive com-
missions of the same crime at separate trials.
40. It has been claimed that recurrent factual patterns will emerge by which the mean-
ing of "same transaction" will become fixed. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 23, at 298
n.158. The experience both of those states that have adopted the test, see note 38 supra,
and of civil law belies that claim. See IB MooRE's FEDERAL PaAcrlCE 0.410[1], at 1157-
58 (2d ed. 1974); Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
Even Justice Brennan concedes that the same-transaction test is not self-defining. Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 n.8 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). This want of def-
initional precision is most keenly apparent in the totality-of-the-circumstances variant of
the same-transaction test. That variant considers all that transpired to determine whether
two offenses are the same. E.g., State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581, 583-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972). Such a formless test depends entirely upon the judge's predilections. It implements
haphazardly at best the invariable principle of finality which lies at the heart of the
double jeopardy protection.
41. See State v. Fitzgerald, 267 Or. 266, 273, 516 P.2d 1280, 1284 (1973) (applying de
facto identical-element test to effectuate same-transaction test); State v. Patterson, 513
P.2d 517 (Or. App. 1973) (applying de facto same-evidence test to effectuate same-transac-
tion test).
42. Compare Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (under same-evidence test, there
are as many crimes as victims of robbery) with State v. Gilbert, 574 P.2d 313, 318 (Or.
1978) (under same-transaction test, there are as many crimes as owners whose stolen
property is held in defendant's residence).
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II. Criminal Collateral Estoppel-An Inadequate Supplement
Because the same-offense tests, which have been developed to give
content to the Fifth Amendment, fail to implement the purposes of
double jeopardy, many defendants are retried illegitimately and society
is needlessly deprived of the right to try others for the first time. The
same-offense tests, however, do not exhaust the defendant's double
jeopardy protection. Criminal collateral estoppel and res judicata are
also part of the clause's protection and may afford relief when the
strictures of the same-offense tests are not met.43
A. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel adequately supplements
the protection afforded by the same-offense tests; res judicata is rarely
applicable to situations in which the same-offense tests do not already
provide adequate shelter, while collateral estoppel seldom provides any
protection. Res judicata requires that a final judgment on the merits
foreclose any further litigation of the same claim between the same
parties.44 Collateral estoppel applies against parties who have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue4r and precludes relitigating
facts determined in that prior adjudication. 46 The doctrine prevents
43. Both res judicata and collateral estoppel preserve the finality of judgments. Crist
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978). Each is based on considerations of economy and the
desire for certainty in legal relations. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958)
(purpose of collateral estoppel "to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible
inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation"); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948) (res judicata "rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations").
44. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); lB MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAerIcE 0.405[l], at 621-22 (2d ed. 1974). Judgment for the defendant bars the
plaintiff from reinstituting his suit, while judgment for the plaintiff merges all grounds
of recovery and precludes further proceedings.
45. Formerly, collateral estoppel applied only between parties and those in privity
with them. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912). Today, while parties and their privies are still bound by adverse judgments, non-
parties may also claim the benefit of favorable judgments. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (patentee bound by prior determination of patent in-
validity in subsequent suit against different defendant); Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d
837 (3d Cir. 1972) (res judicata applied for benefit of new defendants).
46. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876); lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405[l], at 622-23 (2d ed. 1974). Collateral estoppel differs from res judicata in that it
does not foreclose initiating a new trial, but only relitigating particular facts at a new
trial. In addition, it applies only to facts actually determined at the first trial, not to
those that could have been litigated but were not. Res judicata, by contrast, terminates
even those grounds of recovery or defenses that could have been, but in fact were not,
presented. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 428 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir.
1970).
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a party from contesting in subsequent litigation a fact determined
adversely to him.
Although the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply
primarily to civil litigation, each also operates in the criminal realm.47
Yet neither reliably fulfills the goals of double jeopardy. Criminal res
judicata largely overlaps double jeopardy protection; both bar relitiga-
tion of an acquittal and merge further punishment arising from the
same offense into an initial conviction. Res judicata and double
jeopardy diverge, however, in several important respects. Double jeo-
pardy bars retrial in a large number of cases in which res judicata is
inapplicable because final judgment has not been reached,48 and res
judicata on rare occasions disposes of a case with finality on procedural
grounds without the attachment of jeopardy.49 But even in those cases,
res judicata bars retrial only for the identical offense for which the
defendant has been previously tried. 50 It does not foreclose presenta-
tion of the same evidence to prove a different statutorily-defined of-
fense. Accordingly, it cannot serve as the vehicle to expand double
jeopardy protection. This discussion therefore focuses on criminal
collateral estoppel, which results in the preclusion of particular factual
issues, rather than on res judicata, which causes the preclusion of a
whole criminal charge.' 1
B. Inadequacies of Criminal Collateral Estoppel
In the 1970 Supreme Court case of Ashe v. Swenson,52 the defendant
had been tried previously for robbing one of six victims of a mass
hold-up and a Missouri jury had found him not guilty. Missouri sub-
sequently charged Ashe with a second robbery count and a different
47. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0A18[2], at 2751 (2d ed. 1974). Res judicata
was first applied in a criminal case. See Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355,
538 (1776).
48. For instance, if a person were prosecuted for robbery and the prosecution dis-
missed the case in mid-trial, double jeopardy would bar reprosecution for robbery. See
note 7 supra (jeopardy attaches when jury sworn). Res judicata, however, would allow
the robbery retrial. See, e.g., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (no res judicata before final judgment).
49. E.g., United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916) (res judicata bars govern-
ment from pressing same charge when, under erroneous interpretation of statute of
limitations, judgment for defendant was entered prior to attachment of jeopardy).
50. The same-offense test used for res judicata determinations is literal identity; for
example aggravated assault is the "same" only as aggravated assault, not simple assault.
51. Nomenclature in this field is confusing, as the term res judicata has a generic
meaning comprising both collateral estoppel and the more limited usage of res judicata.
Courts therefore frequently refer to collateral estoppel as res judicata. 1B Mooaz's
FEDERAL PRACTiCE 0A05[l], at 621 (2d ed. 1974).
52. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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jury found him guilty. The Supreme Court reversed Ashe's conviction,
holding that the double jeopardy clause includes collateral estoppel
protection.5 3 Collateral estoppel forecloses litigation of an issue when
it appears that a rational jury could have based its verdict on no other
issue; a high probability that the jury so concluded will not suffice.54
In a civil jury trial, parties who wish to foreclose future inquiry
into adjudicated facts may request specific findings of fact from the
jury.55 In bench trials, the judge may pronounce certain facts or list
them in an opinion.5 6 In either case, the factual grounds for decision
are explicit. The criminal jury, by contrast, returns only a general
verdict-guilty or not guiltyY7 Thus, while the civil special verdict
53. Id. at 445. Virtually identical facts had passed the Court's scrutiny under the due
process clause in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), before the double jeopardy
clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969). Ashe left Hoag standing but emasculated.
Although admittedly never before recognized as a constitutional requirement, collateral
estoppel was traced by the Court in Ashe as "an established rule of federal criminal law"
to United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). 397 U.S. at 443. But Oppenheimer
addressed res judicata, not collateral estoppel. 242 U.S. at 87 (bar theory of res judicata
followed; no collateral estoppel analysis); see p. 970 supra (distinguishing two doc-
trines). The misperception that Oppenheimer dealt with collateral estoppel has become
engrained. See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958); Note, Constitutional
Collateral Estoppel: A Bar to Relitigation of Federal Habeas Decisions, 80 YALE L.J. 1229,
1246 (1971). Whether resulting from misperception or intention, the Ashe Court's reliance
on Oppenheimer comprehends both criminal collateral estoppel and criminal res judicata.
Hence, while in the civil sphere collateral estoppel and res judicata are both known
generically as res judicata, see note 51 supra, both are generically labeled collateral
estoppel in criminal law.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, though recently elevated to constitutional stature,
is not new. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1958) (collateral estoppel "has been
widely employed in criminal cases in both state and federal courts"). Ashe has not
changed the application of federal collateral estoppel, see 397 U.S. at 444, and post-Ashe
courts apply criminal collateral estoppel no differently from their predecessors. Compare
United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974) with United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1961).
54. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1970); United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d
329, 333 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he defendant must carry the burden of proving that the
fact-finder acquitted him because it resolved in his favor the very issue that he seeks to
foreclose from consideration in the second trial.")
Although resolution in the defendant's favor means only that the fact-finder enter-
tained a reasonable doubt on the factual issue, the issue is excluded even when offered
by the prosecution as probative evidence that need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 334; United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1961). The
probability, however, need not rise to logical certainty. The Ashe Court specifically an-
nounced that it was not following "the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th
century pleading book," but was proceeding "with realism and rationality." 397 U.S. at
444. It noted that any more rigid approach would amount to a rejection of collateral
estoppel. Id.
55. Such findings may be a special verdict, FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a), or answers to inter-
rogatories, FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
56. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 34, at 567.
57. Special verdicts are rarely used in criminal cases, even in those jurisdictions that
permit them. See Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Pro-
scriPtion Against Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804, 828-29 (1972).
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frequently determines facts for future litigation, the criminal general
verdict rarely does so.58
An acquittal generally provides no basis for the defendant to invoke
collateral estoppel because it at most means that one fact needed for
conviction is lacking. Since an acquittal is couched in a general denial
of guilt, the identity of that essential fact, as well as of those facts that
the jury may have found against the defendant, is hidden. Particularly
when alternative defenses are used, the difficulties of determining the
jury's mental processes are insuperable.50 A case like Ashe in which a
court can trace the jury's deliberations in reaching an acquittal with
reasonable certainty is therefore rare.60 A conviction, by contrast, con-
clusively determines all issues adversely to the defendant and thus could
support collateral estoppel. But the Sixth Amendment prohibits this
use of a conviction in subsequent criminal trials. 61 The irony is that
while criminal collateral estoppel is rooted in the barren clay of ac-
quittals, it is fenced off from the fertile soil of convictions. The problem
results from the wholesale importation of collateral estoppel, a doctrine
geared to the special verdict of civil law, into criminal law, a realm
committed to the general verdict.
58. United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1979). Exceptions occur
when the trial judge directs a verdict for the defendant because the prosecution has
failed to prove a specific fact, when the defendant concedes all but one issue, or when he
admits everything but relies on an affirmative defense such as insanity.
59. Under the current rule, defense counsel may seek to preserve collateral estoppel in
future cases only at the price of turning the instant trial into a one-issue contest, fore-
going alternative defenses, not challenging general credibility, not blanketly denying the
government's case or pointing to its weak links. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa.
233, 247, 304 A.2d 432, 438, vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), adhered to on remand, 455 Pa.
622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
60. See United States v. King, 563 F.2d 559, 561 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
918 (1978); United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1974). Unlike the result in
Ashe, typically no collateral estoppel arises upon acquittal. See, e.g., Moton v. Swenson,
488 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 957 (1974) (post-Ashe decision uphold-
ing successive Missouri prosecutions for robbery of separate victims of same transaction);
LaFond v. Quatsoe, 325 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (previous trial's finding that
proof insufficient to establish intercourse with child insufficient for collateral estoppel
on contribution to delinquency of a minor). But see Bigelow, Former Conviction and
Former Acquittal, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 487, 500 (1957) (asserting that in nine out of ten
criminal cases, only one issue is contested).
The rule that an acquittal determines all issues in favor of the defendant has been
explicitly followed in several cases. E.g., United States v. Clavin, 272 F. 985 (E.D.N.Y.
1921); United States v. Rachmil, 270 F. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 751
(1923); People v. Walker, 25 Misc. 2d 942, 944, 212 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938 (1960); State v. Little,
87 Ariz. 295, 305, 350 P.2d 756, 762-63 (1960). But see United States v. Halbrook, 36 F.
Supp. 345, 348, 350 (E.D. Mo. 1941) (criticizing Clavin and Rachmil); Developments in
the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 972 n.378 (1959) (criticizing Clavin).
61. The Sixth Amendment entities a criminal defendant to "a trial de novo of the
facts alleged and offered in support of each offense charged against him and to a jury's
independent finding with respect thereto." United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468
(3d Cir. 1943).
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Suggestions to obviate the inscrutability of general verdicts have
been made. Special verdicts could be instituted in criminal cases. This,
however, would undermine a basic rationale for the jury-tempering
the occasional harshness of the law with community feelings. 2 Inter-
viewing jurors from the first trial to determine the basis for their
verdict would also violate the fundamental precept of jury autonomy. 3
Thus many acquitted defendants are denied collateral estoppel on
issues the jury actually found in their favor because it is impossible to
prove jury findings with certainty. 4 Collateral estoppel accordingly
does not adequately supplement the same-offense tests. It too permits
introduction of the same evidence at a subsequent trial in the only
context in which it arises-following an acquittal.
C. A Hypothetical Case
An example best illustrates the inadequacies of current law. Let us
assume that a defendant is charged with assault with a deadly weapon
based on the alleged fact that he drew a gun and pointed it at a police-
man. He offers two alternative defenses: he was unarmed and he was
acting in self-defense against unlawful force. A jury finds him not
guilty. The state subsequently tries the defendant for possession of a
deadly weapon by an ex-felon 0 based on the same putative assault.
This time the defendant is convicted, but the judge exacts only a sus-
62. The jury must be left free to render the simple justice of acquittal, instead of
being channeled down a path, each incremental step along which is inexorable, whose
ultimate destination is conviction. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (Ist Cir.
1969). Nor does the solution lie in allowing the defendant to request a special verdict, as
suggested in Gershenson, Res Judicata in Successive Criminal Prosecutions: Hoag v. State
of New Jersey and a Proposal, 25 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 33, 36-38 (1958). This would pressure
him to waive his Sixth Amendment right to an unfettered jury decision, thereby usually
increasing the chances of his conviction, in order to secure the benefits of collateral
estoppel in subsequent trials should he be acquitted. Confronting the defendant with
such a Hobson's choice cannot be permitted. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 389-94 (1968) (defendant could not be required to surrender Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in order to assert Fourth Amendment
claim).
63. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); cf. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,
267-68 (1915) (allowing such practice in civil cases would "make what was intended to be
a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference").
64. See, e.g., United States v. Dockery, 49 F. Supp. 907, 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (previous
acquittal of possessing alcohol held not to bar prosecution for sale of same; "[w]hile
improbable . . . one may sell distilled spirits without possessing it"); United States v.
Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345, 348-49 (E.D. Mo. 1941) (prosecution for overt acts permitted
although jury in former case may have been of opinion, in reaching verdict of not guilty,
that defendants had not committed offenses charged in present indictment).
65. The latter defense has been accepted in a similar context. See People v. Cherry,
307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
66. See, e.g., Cox v. Gaffney, 459 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972).
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pended sentence. The prosecutor, seeking a harsher sentence, obtains
yet another indictment on the same facts, 67 this time for assault upon
a police officer.
Despite its unfairness to the defendant, this series of prosecutions is
sanctioned by current law. The three offenses are separate under the
dominant same-evidence test 8 because each requires proof of an ele-
ment not contained in the others; 6 thus separate prosecutions will lie.
Collateral estoppel provides no additional protection. The basis of the
first jury's acquittal is uncertain, because it is unclear whether the
jurors believed the defendant was unarmed or justified in his assault.
The acquittal therefore does not bar the second prosecution. Because
the defendant was convicted at the second trial, the conviction cannot
be invoked to support collateral estoppel. 7° There is therefore no bar
to the third prosecution.
This hypothetical exposes telling inadequacies in the current law.
First, the jury in the first trial acquitted the defendant because it
thought he was either unarmed or acting justifiably. The second
prosecution challenges the former possibility while the third flouts the
latter. Because it cannot be ascertained which prosecution violates the
defendant's rights, current law allows both. Second, if the first two
charges had been tried together with the same results, there would
have been conclusive proof that the jury determined the defendant
was armed but acting justifiably. This finding would have collaterally
estopped the third prosecution. But because in the actual sequence the
defendant was forced to endure two trials over the same evidence, he
is afforded no protection against a third. Finally, the two juries that
reviewed the identical evidence reached contrary conclusions. Yet
criminal collateral estoppel is based on the premise that a review of
67. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, App. E, p. 51, Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958)
(prosecutor brought successive murder charges until death penalty imposed); People v.
White, 390 Mich. 245, 259 n.9, 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 n.9 (1973) (prosecutor admits that one
reason for bringing rape charge was dissatisfaction with sentence imposed for kidnapping
conviction).
68. Although two courts found variants of this hypothetical fact situation to be parts
of the same transaction, see Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 409 P.2d 206, 48
Cal. Rptr. 366 (1966); State v. Ahuna, 52 Hawaii 321, 474 P.2d 704 (1970), virtually any
result can be reached under that test, see note 38 supra; cf. Fews v. State, I Ga. App. 122,
125, 58 S.E. 64, 66 (1907) (finding defendant's two consecutive shootings in one melee
two transactions). Nor can the identical-element test provide adequate protection; it
would not prevent successive trials on the second and third charges. See note 39 supra.
69. The first and third charges both require proof of an assault, but they differ in
that the first requires use of a deadly weapon, while the third requires that the victim
be a police officer. The first and second both require proof of possession of a gun, but
for the first an assault must be shown, while for the second only the defendant's status as
an ex-felon need be demonstrated.
70. See p. 973 supra (Sixth Amendment bars use of conviction for collateral estoppel).
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the cold record can reconstruct what the jury rationally must have
determined.71 Imputing to a jury the logical consequences of its ul-
timate findings ignores the jury's strongest selling point-injection of
community sentiment and a feeling of justice.72
III. A Proposed Solution
Collateral estoppel, as currently applied, fails to remedy the short-
comings in double jeopardy protection left by the same-offense tests.
The problem lies in the restrictive and illogical fashion in which it is
applied, as the hypothetical above highlights. A liberalization of col-
lateral estoppel application consonant with the purposes of the double
jeopardy clause is accordingly required.
A. Proposal
To implement the purposes of double jeopardy left unfulfilled by
both the same-offense tests and criminal collateral estoppel, the follow-
ing proposal is offered.
Because any conviction(s) is hereby deemed to punish fully
the defendant for all elements alleged against him, and an
acquittal of all charges is hereby deemed to establish the
falsity of all averments against the defendant alleged by the
prosecution and denied by the defendant:
(1) The prosecution shall not allege in its case-in-chief 73 a
fact7 4 previously alleged, and, if he was previously acquit-
ted, denied by the defendant-unless the original and
subsequent courts derive their authority from separate
71. See p. 972 supra.
72. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968); United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113, 1130-33 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see p. 974 supra; Note, Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 419, 432-43 (1969). Expecting rationality from a jury
drawn for its quintessentially arational qualities is irrational. The proposal made by this
Note avoids claims of divining jury mentality; it relies instead on the premise that juries
render just verdicts, without attempting to explain how such verdicts are reached in
individual cases.
73. The government's "case-in-chief" refers to those facts alleged by the government
to establish the elements necessary to sustain its prima facie case for conviction. See, e.g.,
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). It does not include impeachment evidence or
rebuttal of an affirmative defense. The reason that the proposal excludes impeachment
evidence is that, were it included, the defendant could lie about matters that were dis-
cussed in previous trials, and the government would be powerless to expose him. Like-
wise, the proposal applies only to issues raised by the government; otherwise, defendants
could immunize certain facts from future scrutiny by raising them by way of affirmative
defense in the present trial.
74. Whether the fact sought to be reintroduced is characterized as "ultimate" (a fact
necessary for conviction) or "evidentiary" (probative of an ultimate fact) is irrelevant.
Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1972).
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sovereigns7 5 or neither has jurisdiction to hear both
charges;76
(2) The foregoing shall not apply to:
(a) charges arising from circumstances that occur after
commencement of trial77 or from information that comes
to the prosecutor's attention after commencement of
trial, 78 provided the prosecutor exercised due diligence
prior to trial;7 9
(b) counts the defendant moves to sever and reserve for
subsequent adjudication or charges that both sides agree
to reserve;80
75. See note 6 supra (both state and federal governments may prosecute identical
offense).
76. The estoppel created by the proposal perpetuates the limitations inherent under
existing law in the following respects. First, it does not extend to charges with the same
factual base that must be tried by different jurisdictions. See Dunham v. United States,
125 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1942). Second, it is inapplicable to charges that must be tried before
different courts within the same jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Sleeper, 36 Or. App. 227,
584 P.2d 333 (1978) (municipal court conviction of driving under influence of intoxicants
does not bar prosecution in circuit court for criminal activity in drugs when both arose
from same transaction but neither court had jurisdiction over both); State v. Van Landuyt,
157 N.J. Super. 469, 475-76, 385 A.2d 236, 239 (1978) (superior court prosecution for
larceny of auto permissible following municipal court conviction of operating auto with-
out owner's permission).
77. Under this provision, the prosecution will retain the option, enjoyed under current
law, of retrying a defendant for perjury committed at his first trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (acquittal of
lawyer on charge of wrongfully endeavoring to influence witness does not bar prosecution
for perjury in misrepresenting whom he was trying to influence); United States v.
Gremillion, 464 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972) (acquittal for
fraudulent sale of securities followed by prosecution for perjury in denying guilt to grand
jury). But see United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971) (collateral estoppel bars
prosecution for perjury following acquittal for mail theft). Double jeopardy objections to
this practice have been raised, because it effectively allows the prosecution to retry an
acquitted defendant for the underlying substantive offense. E.g., Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App.
255, 73 So. 137 (1916); Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and
Collateral Estoppel, 74 HARV. L. REv. 752 (1961).
78. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 481 Pa. 474, 393 A.2d 3 (1978) (after conviction
of assault, second prosecution for subsequent death of victim allowed under same-trans-
action test). If new evidence arises during trial, the prosecutor should be required to
inform the court and, upon the defendant's motion, to join the new charges.
79. As presently applied, the double jeopardy clause forbids successive prosecution and
cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense. See note 23 supra.
Current law excepts, however, those cases in which the state cannot proceed on the
greater offense because additional facts necessary to sustain it have not yet occurred or
haic not been discovered despite exercise of due diligence. Jeffers v. United States, 432
U.S. 137, 151-52 (1977) (plurality opinion).
When the defendant is convicted under this exception on evidence for which he has
already been punished, the court exacting the second sentence should credit against it
time already served. See United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1979) (time served
must be credited upon reconviction of same offense).
80. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977) (plurality opinion) (defendant
who elects to have two offenses tried separately cannot complain of double jeopardy
violation).
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(c) charges the prosecutor moves to reserve for subsequent
adjudication because they are so complicated that con-
solidation would overwhelm the jury.8 '
This proposal bars introduction of the same evidence 82 against the
accused83 in successive criminal trials8 4 regardless of whether the first
trial ended in acquittal or conviction. 5 The proposal makes no reform
for simultaneous prosecutions because if numerous charges are tried
together, the Blockburger test already adequately determines whether
conviction on more than one charge is permissible. For subsequent
prosecutions, the proposal introduces changes. If convicted, the de-
fendant would be deemed to have already been punished adequately
for the fact(s) alleged. If acquitted, the alleged fact(s) would be con-
sidered false. The prosecutor would therefore have an incentive to
include all charges with overlapping evidence in his initial indict-
ment or information, or to move pursuant to (2)(c) to reserve an over-
lapping charge.
As a corollary effect, the proposal will prevent the government from
introducing evidence of similar acts previously alleged against the de-
fendant.88 If acquitted in the prior case, the defendant may already
81. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 684 (2d ed. 1961) ("The jury system is unworkable
unless the prosecution is confined to a relatively simple issue which can be disposed of
in a relatively short time.")
82. The proposal bars testimony by different witnesses about the same fact; otherwise,
the government could easily circumvent its requirements.
83. Under current law as well, criminal collateral estoppel does not apply for the
protection of codefendants. E.g., Coleman v. United States, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 273, 234 S.W.2d 556, 558-59 (1950).
84. The proposal extends neither criminal collateral estoppel to the civil realm, see
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (in subsequent civil suit, no collateral estoppel
arises from prior acquittal), nor civil collateral estoppel to the criminal realm, see United
States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of civil proceedings for mail fraud
does not bar criminal prosecution).
85. The proposal applies only after trial and judgment of acquittal or conviction and
thus excludes from its ambit the guilty plea, pretrial dismissal, and mistrial. Under cur-
rent law, collateral estoppel cannot arise before final verdict. See FTC v. Food Town
Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (order granting stay not final
adjudication on merits, hence no estoppel); United States v. Ten Firearms & Twenty-
Four Rounds, 444 F. Supp. 305, 308 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (no collateral estoppel for failure to
return an indictment); People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 340, 341 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) (no
collateral estoppel following release after preliminary hearing). Because after mistrial the
defendant has not been punished on the basis of the evidence introduced nor has the
jury determined facts in his favor, the proposal does not come into play. Differences
between the trial and guilty-plea contexts also justify the distinction that the proposal
draws between them. It is speculative upon which evidence the prosecution would have
relied at trial when the defendant pleads guilty. Moreover, the defendant can often
protect himself against future charges for specific offenses by plea-bargaining.
86. Similar-acts evidence, see note 30 supra, will still be admissible under the proposal
in criminal cases when it concerns previous acts for which the defendant has not been
978
Double Jeopardy
have proven the untruthfulness of this evidence.87 And if convicted, the
jury88 should not be induced to convict 9 on the basis of elements from
the defendant's past for which he has already been punished.9
B. Merits of the Proposal
Unlike other suggestions for improving double jeopardy protec-
tion,91 the instant proposal does not break radically from existing law
and thus can be instituted with a minimum of discontinuity. 2 By ex-
tried. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1941) (evidence of drowning of de-
fendant's former wife, for which no criminal charges filed, admitted in trial for drowning
of later wife); United States v. Juarez, 561 F.2d 65, 70 (7th Cir. 1977) (similar acts evidence
introduced when charges of prior crime had been dismissed).
87. The jury in the prior trial may well have found the point in the defendant's favor,
yet the jury in the second case may be tempted to convict on the basis of the previous
crime. See Bray, supra note 15, at 514.
88. At sentencing, once the jury's role is completed, the state may point out pre-
vious convictions to the judge. The fact of the defendant's prior convictions is thereby
admitted, not to induce a fact-finder to find guilt based on evidence already introduced,
but for the legitimate purpose of illuminating the defendant's character for rehabilitative
and punitive purposes. See United States ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 422 F.2d 354, 356
(3d Cir. 1970) (evidence of prior conviction admitted for sentencing purposes only).
89. The exclusion of similar-acts evidence does not extend to its use for impeachment
purposes, for were it excluded, the defendant could commit perjury concerning prior
crimes without fear of being exposed. See Bray, supra note 15, at 495-97; cf. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (evidence tainted by Miranda violation excluded from prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief but allowed for impeachment).
90. The government frequently seeks to introduce such evidence under the guise of
proving one element of its case-in-chief when the underlying purpose is the illegitimate
one of discrediting the defendant's character. E.g., United States v. Carter, 482 F.2d 738, 740
(D.C. Cir. 1973); see, e.g., United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972). Beyond
its enormous consumption of court time, United States v. Mastrototaro, 455 F.2d 802 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972), such a practice violates the double jeopardy clause,
cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (impossible for jury to segregate introduc-
tion of evidence to only one purpose).
91. Proposals have included the following: (1) Combine the same-transaction test with
the right of the state to appeal. See Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 35 (1960). This proposal was rejected in
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). (2) Undertake a general codification of
existing criminal laws into same-offense categories. See J. SIGLER, supra note I, at 195.
This would obviously require comprehensive legislative action. (3) Change the same-
evidence test from "any" different evidence to "materially" different evidence. See
Haddad & Mulock, supra note 11, at 533. Absent promulgation of objective criteria of
what is "material," this proposal would relegate defendants to judges' subjectivity, a
fault discussed in note 40 sulra. (4) Combine all civil and criminal claims arising from
the same transaction. See Note, supra note 24, at 354 & n.80; Note, Professor George H.
Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Correction for Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J. 1050, 1115
(1962). Present law separates the civil and criminal spheres. Cf. United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 364 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("our Constitution has
totally rejected, the continental system of compounding criminal proceedings with civil
adjudications"). Further, the same-transaction test remains unworkably vague. See p. 968
supra. (5) Eliminate the double jeopardy clause. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YAr
L.J. 674, 688 (1926). The Fifth Amendment currently stands in the way of that proposal.
92. The proposal could be adopted by either the federal courts as an extension of
current law or by the state courts as an interpretation of local double jeopardy law. See,
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tending principles of criminal collateral estoppel to supplement the
Blockburger test, it introduces a workable same-transaction test. The
proposal uses an intuitive notion of the same transaction to eliminate
the possibility of definitional manipulation that fatally flaws the exist-
ing same-transaction test. Crimes related as parts of the same transac-
tion cannot be tried without overlapping evidentiary presentation.
Thus, the proposal would require all such crimes to be tried simul-
taneously. To the extent temporally proximate crimes can be prosecuted
separately under the proposal, they must be supported by totally dif-
ferent evidence and thus cannot be incidents of the same transaction,
as properly defined. The same-transaction test was formulated both to
prevent repetition of the same evidence at succeeding trials and to
protect the defendant from twice being placed in jeopardy on the same
totality of circumstances. This proposal avoids both harms.
The double jeopardy policy against repeated trial for the same of-
fense applies equally to a second trial on the same evidence. This pro-
posal will free defendants from having to face retrial for the same
statutorily-defined offense or to relitigate the same facts under the
guise of different statutory provisions or multiple violations of the
same provision.9 3 Therefore, the second two prosecutions described in
the hypothetical above would be foreclosed. The proposal would per-
mit the defendant to be tried for all three crimes, but only as multiple
counts at one trial. Society is thus afforded ample opportunity to seek
redress for all violations of its statutes, while the defendant is protected
against successive prosecutions on the same evidence.94 The proposal,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974) (same-transaction test adopted pursuant to supervisory powers); State v. Brown,
262 Or. 442, 453, 497 P.2d 1191, 1196 (1972), overruled in part, State v. Hammang, 271 Or.
749, 756 n.4, 534 P.2d 501, 504 nA (1975) (same-transaction test adopted under Oregon
Constitution). Because the proposal does not require the reversal of any constitutional
precedents, it could be adopted through legislation.
93. An example of the latter tactic is Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), in which
the defendant had murdered his wife and three children. The defendant was convicted
seriatim of the murder of his wife, the murder of one child, and the murder of another.
At each of the three trials, evidence of all four murders was tendered. The prosecution "in
effect tried the accused for four murders three consecutive times, massing in each trial the
horrible details of each of the four deaths." Id. at 575 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The claim
that each jury considered only evidence relevant to the specific charge before them is
disingenuous, for evidence of the additional murders was unnecessary to prove the charged
murder in each trial; rather, it was introduced for the illicit purpose of prejudicing the
jury against the defendant. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld his convictions under
the same-evidence test.
94. Under the present proposal, as soon as the government seeks to introduce any
previously introduced evidence, the defendant can have it excluded. The same-evidence
test, by contrast, allows vexatious litigation. It forces the defendant to endure prosecution,
waiting for the government to rest its case before he can brief and argue substantial
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by protecting the defendant from needless litigation, from allegation of
facts a jury may already have determined in his favor, and from double
punishment upon proof of the same facts, thus fulfills the goal that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause [be] liberally construed in light of its
great historic purpose to protect the citizen from more than one trial
for the same act." 95
identity of evidence. The defendant is thus forced to suffer through jeopardy in order to
prove it was barred ab initio. Thus, the instant proposal better fulfills the goals of the
double jeopardy clause. Cf. Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 287 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 924 (1979) (double jeopardy means constitutional immunity from having to
undergo hazard of second trial).
95. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 396 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
